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VIEWING VIRTUAL PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
THROUGH THE LENS OF INNOVATION
RYAN VACCA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which you design software. Maybe you are an
entrepreneurial programmer working at night in your basement to create amazing
software that will revolutionize a particular industry or entertain the masses.
After months of slaving away at the computer, writing code, debugging software,
and fine-tuning your work, the program is complete. Because most consumers use
a version of Microsoft Windows, you write your software to be Windowscompatible. The software is advertised nationwide, and consumers can purchase
the software from your website. Hundreds of thousands of consumers go to your
website and pay to download a copy of the software. Your software is a
commercial success, and you can now retire early.
With your new fortune in hand, you head out the door to take a much needed
vacation. On the way out, you see a letter addressed to you from Microsoft. You
quickly open the letter and are shocked by what you read. Microsoft claims that it
owns the copyright in the software you created and demands all of the profits you
made from the sales of your software. The letter explains that, as part of the
license agreement you accepted when you installed Microsoft Windows on your
computer, you agreed that any copyrights in software you created that was used in
Microsoft Windows would be assigned to Microsoft. Because Microsoft owns the
copyright in your software, you do not have the right to sell it. Identical letters
have been sent not only to you, but also to programmers all over the country.
This situation has not happened, but if it did, you could imagine the outrage
of programmers and the industries for which they produce software. The number
of programmers creating software would plummet, and new programmers would
not be incentivized to enter the market. Industries that rely on new software
would suffer from a lack of innovation.1

* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law (2008–2009). B.A.,
Amherst College, 2001; J.D., University of Missouri, 2004; LL.M., New York University, 2008.
The author gratefully thanks Eugene Antipov, Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss, Melynda Barnhart,
Ryan Burke, Carter Dillard, Andrew Grossman, Brent Horton, Claire Mumme, Professor William
Nelson, Read Porter, Professor Katherine Strandburg, and Genevieve York-Erwin for their
significant contributions, insight, and comments. They are not responsible for any errors, for which
the author accepts all responsibility.
1. The immediate harm to such industries might be lessened depending on whether
Microsoft licensed the software and what the terms of use were. However, the long-term harm to
the industries from a lack of innovators would persist.
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Now consider a second story, similar to the first. Imagine you are sitting in
front of your computer at home logged into a virtual world—a world experienced
on the computer screen and negotiated with your keyboard and mouse. In this
virtual world, you have a house and a car, and you socialize with others who are
logged in from all over the world. The virtual world was created by a software
developer named ABC, Inc. To make this virtual world more interesting after
several months of use, you stay up late in the evenings designing a small piece of
software that will be represented as a new house in the virtual world (a virtual
house) that has a design never before seen in the virtual world (or the real world
for that matter). After several weeks of hard work and late nights, you finish
designing the virtual house. You place the new virtual house in the virtual world
and put up a "for sale" sign. Within minutes, several other users offer to buy a
copy of your virtual house. Over the next several months, you sell hundreds of
virtual houses. Inspired by your recent success, you go on to develop other virtual
items, all of which are coveted by your fellow users.
Then one day you receive an email from ABC, Inc., which claims that it owns
the copyright in the virtual property you created. The email explains that as part
of the license agreement you clicked on when you entered the virtual world, you
agreed that any copyrights in virtual property you created would be assigned to
ABC, Inc. Because ABC, Inc., owns the copyright in your virtual property, you
do not have the right to sell that property. Identical emails have been sent to all
users who developed their own virtual property in ABC, Inc.’s virtual world.
Just as in the first story, users who create virtual property will not have as
much incentive to enter the market, and users who enjoy the virtual property will
suffer as a result. However, unlike the first purely hypothetical scenario, this
second scenario has become reality. However, why we have tolerated the second
story, but would not imagine tolerating the first is unclear. Perhaps this tolerance
is attributable to uncertainty about how to treat virtual property; nonetheless,
innovation and creativity are stifled under both scenarios.
Over the past several years, many scholars have wrestled with the idea of
how property rights for items created in virtual worlds should be conceptualized.
Some have discussed utilitarian models,2 others have examined a Lockean natural
rights theory,3 and still others view virtual property merely as another form of
intellectual property.4 Regardless of how virtual property is conceptualized and
which theory it best fits, most, if not all, commentators agree that the law ought
to recognize virtual property as property and vest someone with those rights.5
2. See, e.g., F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 44–46 (2004); Theodore J. Westbrook, Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual World
Property Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 795–97 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 46–48; Westbrook, supra note 2, at 791–
95.
4. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, There Is No Spoon, in THE STATE OF PLAY:LAW, GAMES, AND
VIRTUAL WORLDS 180 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., New York University Press)
(2006).
5. See, e.g., Andrew E. Jankowich, Property and Democracy in Virtual Worlds, 11 B.U. J.
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This Article moves beyond the initial debate about how property rights in
virtual property should be viewed and asks two new questions from a new
perspective. First, who ought to own the property rights in virtual property so that
innovation and creativity can be maximized? The question is whether it should be
the users who write the code and create the property or the developer-companies
that initially create the virtual world and provide access to it. Second, how can the
law be modified to remove barriers that unnecessarily impede creation of a
regime that maximizes creativity and innovation in virtual worlds?
There is no clear answer to the first question. Evidence supports the notion
that the users who participate in these virtual worlds and create the virtual
property should be the owners of the virtual property rights.6 The economic
incentives associated with property ownership may be important to maximize
innovation and creativity in the virtual world context. On the other hand, strong
counterarguments and alternatives suggest that ownership by the original
software developers may best promote cumulative innovation and creativity.7
Regardless of the answer, it is clear that there exists the potential for an
innovation-maximizing system different from what exists presently.
As to the second question, I argue that the current state of the law causes
virtual-world developers to be unwilling to relinquish their hold over virtual
property rights. Developers’ reluctance to allow users to own virtual property
rights results from fears of liability, loss of control, and being forced to create at a
more rapid pace to keep users interested in the virtual world.8 To relieve these
concerns and allow the possibility for a regime that may put virtual property in
the hands of those who will maximize innovation and creativity, I urge the
creation of a legislative safe harbor that would provide an incentive for
developers to hand over some control and explore property allocation regimes
that may maximize innovation and creativity.9
Part II of this Article introduces the concepts of virtual worlds and virtual
property—the types of worlds, who participates, the commercial impact, and the
traditional and new models of property ownership currently used in virtual
worlds. Part III explores how virtual worlds are not spaces separate from the real
world, but are instead complementary to it. Additionally, Part III examines
whether granting ownership of user-created virtual property to users or to
developers would best maximize innovation and creativity. Part IV examines the
problems facing virtual world developers and explains why the traditional model
has been strongly adhered to by almost all developers. Finally, Part V considers
SCI. & TECH. L. 173, 176 (2005) (“[E]mbracing property rights is a prerequisite to resolving
governance issues in virtual worlds and necessary to allow further evolution of communities in
virtual worlds and increase the autonomy of game participants.”); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note
2, at 13 (“[T]he primary theories of property are consistent with the concept of property rights in
virtual assets.”).
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Parts IV.A–C.
9. See infra Part V.
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whether a legislatively created safe harbor would incentivize developers to hand
over ownership of user-created virtual property to users. Such a provision has the
potential to benefit both virtual world users and the real world. This Part analyzes
several different forms that the safe harbor could take, suggests an approach, and
discusses other issues that should be further explored before implementation.
II. VIRTUAL WORLDS AND VIRTUAL PROPERTY
Although virtual worlds have existed for a number of years, their introduction
into legal scholarship has been rather recent. To put this Article in context, it is
necessary to have a solid understanding of virtual worlds generally, the role of
virtual property specifically, and how ownership of virtual property is currently
addressed.
A. Virtual Worlds – What and Who is Involved?
Virtual worlds are, quite simply, artificial and imaginary online spaces where
users interact with each other.10 Users exist and are represented in virtual worlds
via a proxy known as an avatar.11 Avatars are graphical representations (or
misrepresentations)12 of the real-world user.13 Depending on the virtual world,
avatars can be customized to appear as humans, aliens, monsters, or even a
rubber duck or “a fruit salad encased in gelatin”14 and can further be
individualized with clothing, weapons, or other accessories.15 Avatars
communicate with one another through speech bubbles or chat windows in
addition to facial expressions and body language.16 Some virtual worlds require
users to maintain their avatars. For example, in The Sims Online, avatars have
needs that must be continually addressed by users, including the need to eat, rest,
shower, use the restroom, and be entertained.17 If the user fails to adequately
address the avatar’s needs, then the user’s ability to control the avatar is
affected.18

10. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 7. Virtual worlds have their origins in textbased role-playing games such as Dungeons & Dragons. Id. at 16. For a thorough history of the
development of virtual worlds, see id. at 16–29.
11. See, e.g., id. at 6.
12. See id. at 65 ("Virtual worlds are often like an elaborate masquerade ball, and as in most
masquerades, the least popular mask is the one that you wear in real life.").
13. Bobby Glushko, Tales of the (Virtual) City: Governing Property Disputes in Virtual
Worlds, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 507, 509 (2007).
14. Shira Boss, Even in a Virtual World, ‘Stuff’ Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at 3(9),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/business/yourmoney/09second.html?_r=1.
15. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 6.
16. Id.
17. See Sim Needs (Motives) – AKA "Greening," http://sims.stratics.com/content/
gameplay/needtoknow/needs/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
18. Id.
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In some virtual worlds, called “leveling worlds,” users develop their avatars’
skills so that they may be promoted to a higher level and engage in new
activities.19 “Some worlds emphasize problem-solving and adventuring, typically
containing quests to complete and monsters to kill.”20 Users may also “level” by
developing “nonviolent skills, such as blacksmithing or baking bread.”21 Nonleveling virtual worlds, on the other hand, do not have an express goal, but rather
exist merely for the purpose of social interaction.22 However, just as in leveling
worlds, avatars in non-leveling worlds can develop virtual skills and accumulate
virtual wealth.23
Virtual worlds also have relevance beyond the gaming context. They have the
potential to be used “for commerce, for education, for professional, military, and
vocational training, for medical consultation and psychotherapy, and even social
and economic experimentation to test how social norms develop.”24 Regardless of
whether a virtual world is leveling or merely a social network, a distinguishing
feature of virtual worlds from non-networked computer games is that they are
“both persistent and dynamic.”25 When users are not present in the virtual world,
the virtual world continues without them and continues to change.26 When users
return, they will encounter a world that is not identical to the one they left.27 In
this way, virtual worlds are analogous to the real world: just as the real world
continues and changes while you sleep, so too do virtual worlds.
The content and overall look and feel of each world varies from world to
world. There.com, a non-leveling social-networking virtual world, holds itself out
as a place where users can meet friends, play games, and explore and build the
world.28 There.com users can shop, go to parties, listen to music, and drive dune
buggies around islands.29 Recently, There.com entered into an agreement with
Capitol Music Group allowing real-world bands to play at virtual nightclubs and

19. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 26–28; Michael Meehan, Virtual Property:
Protecting Bits in Context, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, 7 (2006), available at http://
law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i2/article7.pdf.
20. Glushko, supra note 13, at 509 (footnote omitted). See also Lastowka & Hunter, supra
note 2, at 26–27 (mentioning various examples of “leveling” in virtual worlds).
21. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 27.
22. See Glushko, supra note 13, at 509–10; Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 28.
23. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 28.
24. Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2044 (2004); see also Reality, Only Better, ECONOMIST TECH. Q.,
Dec. 8, 2007, at 18 (describing how the Marine Corps is using virtual worlds to train soldiers for
combat on the battlefield).
25. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 5.
26. Id. at 5–6.
27. See id. at 6.
28. There.com, What is There?, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.there.com/
help.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
29. Alorie Gilbert, Online Game Envisions New Virtual Worlds, CNET NEWS, Oct. 26,
2003, http://www.news.com/2100-1041_3-5097219.html.
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permitting users to meet and talk to the musicians in their avatar forms.30
EverQuest and World of Warcraft are leveling worlds filled with characters such
as knights, wizards, clerics, dwarves, trolls, and other mythical creatures.31 In
these virtual worlds, users generally spend their time slaying monsters,
completing adventures, and developing skills such as mining, or fishing, or
leatherworking.32 Other virtual worlds are more hedonistic. Red Light Center, for
example, is an adult-oriented virtual world where users can indulge in virtual sex
and drug use.33
Virtual-world users are not solely composed of teenage boys as one might
imagine. In fact, most users are adults.34 For example, in Second Life, a nonleveling virtual world, users range in age from eighteen to eighty-five and come
from over one hundred countries. 35 Sixty percent of those users are men, and
forty percent are women.36 And while more men have signed up for Second Life
accounts, women spend more time logged in.37 EverQuest users are, on average,
twenty-six years old,38 and women make up sixteen percent of the population.39
One study found that two-thirds of virtual world users are employed and half
have full-time jobs.40
The number of users worldwide is enormous. In 2007, World of Warcraft had
9.3 million subscribers,41 and one study estimates that figure to be 10 million

30. Dean Takahashi, There.com Signs Deal with CMG for Band Appearances in Virtual
Nightclubs, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 27, 2007, http://blogs.mercurynews.com/aei/2007/
06/27/therecom_signs_deal_with_cmg_for_band_appearances_in_virtual_nightclubs.
31. EverQuest: Character Classes, http://everquest.station.sony.com (select “Classes” from
main menu) (last visited Dec. 3, 2008); World of Warcraft: Races, http://
www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/races/index.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
32. World of Warcraft: Professions, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/professions (last
visited Dec. 3, 2008).
33. Red Light Center, http://www.redlightcenter.com (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
34. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 785 (citing EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS 58
(University of Chicago Press) (2005)).
35. Second Life: Frequently Asked Questions, http://secure-web9.secondlife.com/whatis/
faq.php (last visited on Dec. 3, 2008). Also, Second Life has a separate world for teens called Teen
Second Life. See Teen Second Life, http://teen.secondlife.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
36. Second Life: Frequently Asked Questions, http://secure-web9.secondlife.com/whatis/
faq.php (last visited on Dec. 3, 2008).
37. Cory Ondrejka, Collapsing Geography: Second Life, Innovation, and the Future of
National Power, 2 INNOVATIONS 27, 35 (2007).
38. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 785 (citing EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS 58
(2005)).
39. See NICHOLAS YEE, THE NORRATHIAN SCROLLS: A STUDY OF EVERQUEST 10 (2001),
http://www.nickyee.com/report.pdf.
40. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 785–86 (citing Nicholas Yee, The Daedalus Project: The
Psychology of MMORPGS, Occupational Status, Marital Status, and Children (Sept. 3, 2003),
http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/000550.php).
41. World of Dealcraft, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2007, at 73.
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today. 42 The largest portion of those users were from Asia, followed by North
America.43 During that same period, RuneScape, Lineage, and Lineage II had
between 1 and 1.5 million subscribers.44 One study estimates that there are
currently sixteen million virtual-world users worldwide.45 Another study found
that users spend approximately twenty-two hours per week in virtual worlds.46 In
fact, some users seem to spend more time in virtual worlds than they do working
or participating in their own real communities.47
The many users involved with virtual worlds generate a large amount of
money. In short, “[v]irtual worlds have developed into a serious economic
force.”48 A report by DFC Intelligence found that the online game market was
valued at $3.4 billion in 2005 and was expected to grow to over $13 billion by
2011.49 While some virtual worlds provide basic membership for free,50 many
charge a subscription fee.51 Virtual world developers including Sony and
Electronic Arts have earned hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue.52 Part of
42. Bruce Sterling Woodcock, An Analysis of MMOG Subscription Growth 23.0, http://
www.mmogchart.com/Chart11.html (April 9, 2008).
43. Bruce Sterling Woodcock, An Analysis of MMOG Subscription Growth 23.0, http://
www.mmogchart.com/analysis-and-conclusions (April 9, 2008).
44. Bruce Sterling Woodcock, An Analysis of MMOG Subscription Growth 23.0, http://
www.mmogchart.com/Chart1.html (April 9, 2008).
45. Bruce Sterling Woodcock, An Analysis of MMOG Subscription Growth 23.0, http://
www.mmogchart.com/Chart4.html (April 9, 2008).
46. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 780 n.5 (citing Nicholas Yee, Hours of Play Per Week, The
Daedalus Project: The Psychology of MMORPGS (Feb. 21, 2004), http://
www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/000758.php).
47. Kevin W. Saunders, Virtual Worlds—Real Courts, 52 VILL. L. REV. 187, 191 (2007)
(citing Beth Simone Noveck, Introduction: The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004)).
48. Glushko, supra note 13, at 507.
49. Press Release, DFC Intelligence, Online Game Market Forecasted to Reach $13 Billion
by 2011 (June 6, 2006), http://www.dfcint.com/news/prjune62006.html.
50. Second Life and There.com both provide free basic membership. See Second Life:
Membership, Land, & Pricing, http://secondlife.com/whatis/pricing.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2008);
There Registration: Free Membership, http://www.there.com/start_membership.html (last visited
Dec. 3, 2008).
51. Second Life offers a Premium Account for $9.95 per month that allows users to own
land. See Second Life: Membership, Land, & Pricing, supra note 50. Red Light Center, a hedonistic
virtual world, also permits a free limited membership, but charges $20 per month for VIP access.
See Red Light Center Frequently Asked Questions: Support & Billing Questions,
http://www.redlightcenter.com/faqs.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). World of Warcraft charges
users a fee ranging from $12.99 to $14.99 per month. See World of Warcraft General FAQ,
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/faq/general.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
52. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 8 (citing Hiawatha Bray, Hello, World When the
Sims Goes Live Tomorrow, It Carries the Hopes of the PC Gaming Industry to the Internet – The
New Frontier for the Fastest Growing Tech Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2002, at C1; Mike
Snider, When Multiplayer Worlds Collide, USA TODAY, June 24, 2003, at 1D); see also World of
Dealcraft, supra note 41, at 73 (“Blizzard will have revenues of $1.1 billion this year and operating
profits of $520 m[illion].”).
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this revenue comes from real-world companies advertising their products in the
virtual worlds. For example, in 2002, McDonald’s and Intel paid Electronic Arts,
the developer of The Sims Online, $2 million to include their logos in the game.53
B. Virtual Property – What Is It?
Within these various virtual worlds are many forms of virtual property,
including items such as clothing, cars, swords, shields, and artwork. Virtual
property in some worlds is similar to its real-world counterpart.54 Items “are
subject to wear and tear”—toilets get clogged, houses require repair, and
appliances need fixing.55 These items, of course, are nothing more than computer
code.
Who creates the virtual property that populates these virtual worlds? Some
virtual property is created by developers, but most is created by users. 56 As
Professor Balkin explains, “many game spaces give players considerable freedom
to add new things to the game space, so that they, in effect, become subdesigners
of the virtual world.”57 In these situations, users create myriad types of virtual
properties that play important roles in the virtual world.58 For example, in Second
Life, users can create virtual property by selecting from a palate of building
blocks called “prims” and then piecing together and modifying the prims to create
a new object.59 New textures and shapes can also be added to the prim palate by
using various software applications.60 Users can write computer code, called
“script,” to give their objects the ability to interact.61 A user can, for example,
write a script to enable a virtual airplane to fly, spin upside down, and land.
Other than enriching virtual worlds by providing avatars with something to
wear, drive, or wield, what use does virtual property serve for users? Just as in the
53. Matt Richtel, Big Mac is Virtual, But Critics Are Real, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at
G8.
54. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 30.
55. Id.
56. Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User-Created Content and Building the
Metaverse, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 158, 160 (Jack M. Balkin
& Beth Simone Noveck eds., New York University Press) (2004) (citing David Becker, The Secret
Behind ‘The Sims’ (March 16, 2001), http://news.com/2008-1082-254218.html) (asserting that
80% of the content in The Sims is user-created).
57. Balkin, supra note 24, at 2049.
58. See id.
59. Todd David Marcus, Fostering Creativity in Virtual Worlds: Easing the Restrictiveness
of Copyright for User-Created Content, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 67, 73 (2007).
60. Id. at 75 (citing Andrew LaVallee, Now, Virtual Fashion: Second Life Designers Make
Real Money Creating Clothes for Simulation Game’s Players, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2006, at B1;
Second Life Fashion Design: Using the Templates, http://s3.amazonaws.com/static-secondlifecom/downloads/textures/fashion/Using_the_SL_Fashion_Design_Templates.pdf (last visited Dec.
3, 2008)).
61. Marcus, supra note 59, at 74 (citing Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Age: User
Created Content and Building the Metaverse, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 92-93 (2004)).

2008]

VIRTUAL PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

41

real world, users sell their property. Markets have developed around these virtual
properties, and transactions take place on online auction websites such as eBay or
via live virtual-world exchanges using third-party services such as PayPal to
transfer funds.62 In 2006, trading of virtual property was estimated at more than
$1 billion a year.63 For instance, in 2005, a user purchased a virtual space station
for nearly $100,000, and in early 2007, three virtual shopping malls were sold for
$179,688.64 Less extreme examples include purchasing virtual clothing for a few
cents65 or a virtual car for $1–2.66 The reason for the creation of markets for
virtual property is the same as the creation of markets in the real world: rather
than spending the time laboring to produce your own property, you can simply
purchase it from someone else who was willing to invest the time and effort.67 It
is important to understand that the virtual economy is directly linked to the realworld economy. Although virtual worlds like Second Life use “Lindens” as ingame currency, this virtual currency can be exchanged for real-world money.68
Thus, users who create and sell their virtual products are not just amassing virtual
wealth; they are also amassing real wealth. In this way, the market for virtual
goods is directly linked to the real-world economy.
This Article does not discuss whether or how virtual property ought to be
conceptualized in terms of property rights. That issue has been extensively
discussed by others.69 Instead, this Article focuses on a particular class of

62. Glushko, supra note 13, at 510–11.
63. Getting Serious, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Dec. 8, 2007, at 2.
64. Dean Irvine, Virtual Worlds, Real Money, CNN, Mar. 12, 2007, http://
edition.cnn.com/2007/TECH/science/03/12/fs.virtualmoney/index.html.
65. See, e.g., Linden Lifestyles: The Unofficial Second Life Fashion Shopping Blog,
http://lindenlifestyles.com/?p=974#more-974 (Mar. 25, 2008, 16:48). The prices are listed in
Lindens, the official currency of Second Life. Although the exchange rate fluctuates somewhat, it
has “remained fairly stable at approximately 250 Linden dollars [] to the US dollar.” Second Life:
Currency Exchange, http://secondlife.com/whatis/currency.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
66. See, e.g., Brands in Second Life, http://www.blogcadre.com/blog/jason_striegel/
brands_in_second_life_2007_07_26_11_56_52 (July 26, 2007).
67. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 37-38.
68. Marcus, supra note 59, at 85. The exchange rate in the past year between Lindens and
U.S. dollars was roughly 270 to 1. David Talbot, The Fleecing of the Avatars, TECH. REV., Jan.
2008, at 58.
69. See generally Balkin, supra note 24 (analyzing how real-world law is used to regulate
freedom in virtual worlds); Jankowich, supra note 10 (considering the implications of virtual
property on governance in virtual worlds); Jamie J. Kayser, The New New-World: Virtual Property
and the End User License Agreement, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 59 (2007) (addressing the need
for a legal presence in the online virtual-world game space); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2
(discussing whether virtual objects ought to be understood as property); Meehan, supra note 19
(examining how virtual property should be conceptualized and proposing default legal rules);
Westbrook, supra note 2 (exploring the applicability of existing property jurisprudence to virtualworld property).
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property, intellectual property, which no one disputes is created in the computer
code and graphics used to represent virtual property.70
C. Existing Models of Virtual Property Ownership
Because of the large amounts of virtual property already in existence and
constantly being created,71 a system of property ownership is needed. Allocation
of property rights in virtual property creates stability and promotes development
in virtual worlds as well as in the real-world interactions and transactions that
result. In general, allocation of property rights largely depends on the End-User
License Agreements (EULAs) of each virtual world.72
The EULA is a software license between the developer and the user (and
generally drafted by the developer) that governs the relationship between these
two parties.73
The EULA is generally presented as a graphical computer window that pops up
when the [user] of the software begins running the program. The [user] is then
presented with the terms of the license, and must click a button indicating that
she has read and accepted those terms. The software will only begin running if
the user agrees to the EULA.74

Two models of EULAs have been developed to allocate rights in virtual
property: the traditional model and the new model.
1. The Traditional Model – Developer-Owned Property
Under the traditional-model EULA, the developer claims ownership in all
intellectual property associated with the virtual world either as the initial author
or, alternatively, through an express assignment of users’ intellectual property
rights to the developer.75 This model is, by far, the most common model of
allocation of intellectual property rights in virtual worlds.76
An example of the traditional model where the developer requires the user to
assign all intellectual property rights to the developer is Entropia Universe. Its
EULA reads in relevant part:

70. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 24, at 2046–47; Jankowich, supra note 10, at 181;
Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 61; Marcus, supra note 59, at 76–77.
71. See Ondrejka, supra note 37, at 35 (“As of June 2007, [Second Life] residents were
adding over 300 gigabytes of data to the world every day . . . .”).
72. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 50.
73. Glushko, supra note 13, at 515.
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. See id. at 514.
76. Id. (“Nearly every virtual world has a clause in their EULA requiring that players assign
the rights of all property created in-game to the developers of that world.”); see also Marcus, supra
note 59, at 79–80.
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Virtual items will often have names similar or identical to corresponding
physical categories such as “people,” “real estate,” “possessions,” and the
names of specific items in those categories such as “house,” “rifle,” “tools,”
“armor,” etc. Despite the similar names, all virtual items are part of the System
and MindArk [the developer] retains all rights, title, and interest in all parts
including, but not limited to Avatars and Virtual Items; these retained rights
include, without limitation, patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret and other
proprietary rights throughout the world.
As part of your interactions with the System, you may acquire, create,
design, or modify Virtual Items, but you agree that you will not gain any
ownership interest whatsoever in any Virtual Item, and you hereby assign to
MindArk all of your rights, title and interest in any such Virtual Item.77

As a comparison, EverQuest’s EULA does not expressly require assignment
of intellectual property rights to the developer, but it arguably asserts these rights
as the initial author:
We and our suppliers shall retain all rights, title and interest, including, without
limitation, ownership of all intellectual property rights relating to or residing in
the Disc, the Software and the Game, all copies thereof, and all game character
data in connection therewith. You acknowledge and agree that you have not
and will not acquire or obtain any intellectual property or other rights,
including any right of exploitation, of any kind in or to the Disc, the Software or
the Game, including, without limitation, in any character(s), item(s), coin(s) or
other material or property, and that all such property, material and items are
exclusively owned by us.78

Regardless of how the ownership in the virtual property accrues, the scope of
developer ownership is generally broad, if not all encompassing.79 Andrew
77. Entropia Universe: End User License Agreement (Dec. 11, 2007), http://
account.entropiauniverse.com/pe/en/rich/107004.html (emphasis added). There.com uses similar
language in its member agreement:
All materials you send to Company, whether or not at our request, including, but not limited
to, e-mail, postings, contest entries, Avatars, There Objects, creative suggestions, ideas, notes,
drawings, materials, concepts or other information . . . (collectively, “Submissions”), shall be
the property of Company and you hereby assign all of your rights, title and interest in and to
such Submissions to [the developer]. . . . Without limitation of the foregoing, Company shall
exclusively own all now known or hereafter existing rights to the Submissions of every kind
and nature, in perpetuity, throughout the world and shall be entitled to unrestricted use of the
Submissions for any purpose whatsoever, commercial or otherwise, without compensation to
the provider of the Submissions.
There.com Terms of Service: Member Agreement, http://webapps.prod.there.com/help/74.xml (last
visited Dec. 3, 2008) (emphasis added).
78. EverQuest User Agreement and Software License ¶ 8 (Aug. 21, 2006), http://help.
station.sony.com/cgi-bin/soe.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=16210 (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., World of Warcraft End User License Agreement ¶ 3A (last updated Feb. 2,
2007), http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/eula.html (“[A]ll title, ownership rights and
intellectual property rights in and to the Game and all copies thereof (including without limitation
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Jankowich describes virtual worlds with these types of EULAs as “worlds where
the [developers] enable the creation of intellectual property by [users] but refuse
to allow them to claim ownership of it.”80 Jankowich further explains:
EULAs stipulating that [developers] own all intellectual property rights in a
virtual world create a situation in which a commons does not exist and cannot
exist until the first copyright terms claimed by the [developer] begin to expire.
There will be no possibility for [users] to freely license or otherwise donate their
virtual property to their fellow [users], and the [developer] is unlikely to do so
for them.81

2. The New Model – User-Retained Ownership
Despite the prevalence of the traditional-model EULAs, a new model of
virtual property ownership has emerged. The most often cited example of this
new model is Linden Lab’s Second Life. Second Life’s Terms of Service provide:
Users of the Service can create Content on Linden Lab’s servers in various
forms. Linden Lab acknowledges and agrees that, subject to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement, you will retain any and all applicable copyright
and other intellectual property rights with respect to any Content you create
using the Service, to the extent you have such rights under applicable law.82

Unlike the traditional model, users under this EULA are permitted to retain
intellectual property rights in the virtual property they create. The Founder and
CEO of Linden Labs stated that the adoption of this new model was intended to
recognize[] the fact that persistent world users are making significant
contributions to building these worlds and should be able to both own the
content they create and share in the value that is created. The preservation of
users’ property rights is a necessary step toward the emergence of genuinely
real online worlds. 83

any titles, computer code, themes, objects, characters, character names, stories, dialog, catch
phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, character inventories, structural or landscape designs,
animations, sounds, musical compositions and recordings, audio-visual effects, storylines, character
likenesses, methods of operation, moral rights, and any related documentation) are owned or
licensed by Blizzard.”).
80. Jankowich, supra note 5, at 189.
81. Id. at 214 (footnote omitted).
82. Second Life Terms of Service § 3.2, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited
Dec. 3, 2008).
83. Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Residents to Own Digital Creations (Nov. 14,
2003), http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/03_11_14.
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Second Life is the only virtual world allowing users to retain ownership of
the intellectual property in virtual property they create.84
III. INNOVATION AND THE ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. The Importance of Innovation to Virtual Worlds and the Real World
Innovation and creativity are cultural foundations based in all civilizations.85
They serve not only to entertain, but also to give creators a voice to express their
grievances, communicate their thoughts to others,86 and create “new social
practices, sensibilities, [and] representations of the world.”87 As one commentator
notes, innovators and artists “can intuit the future, create new models of
communication, behavior, perception, urban planning, even morality and
economy.”88
The creation of virtual property is yet another opportunity for innovators and
artists to influence the cultural development of societies. Users who create virtual
property within virtual worlds certainly add to the richness of those worlds.89 A
virtual world consisting of a black screen with a handful of stick figures moving
about is not as diverse or engaging as the virtual worlds experienced today.
Beyond users’ abilities to view or otherwise interact with new virtual properties,
the properties help construct stories. As several commentators have noted, virtual
worlds are, in a sense, just like novels, movies, or plays.90 Virtual property in the
virtual world is similar to the use of costumes and set designs in a play. The
elements add richness to the show and make it more enjoyable to the theater
patron. However, because virtual worlds are interactive, they are even stronger
forms of storytelling.91 Just as we recognize the social benefits of content-rich
movies, novels, and plays, we can recognize the social benefits provided by
virtual worlds and the richness virtual property adds to these worlds.
The effects are not limited to the virtual world. They extend into the real
world’s culture as well. Virtual worlds do not exist apart from the real world;
indeed, they are complementary and connected.92 The virtual world and the
84. Id. (noting that content created by users in other virtual worlds has historically been the
property of the developer and not the user).
85. See HERVÉ FISCHER, DIGITAL SHOCK: CONFRONTING THE NEW REALITY 110–11 (Rhonda
Mullins trans., McGill-Queens University Press 2006).
86. Balkin, supra note 24, at 2056.
87. FISCHER, supra note 85, at 110.
88. Id. at 112.
89. See Saunders, supra note 47, at 232.
90. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 13 (Basic Books 2006); Balkin, supra note
24, at 2056 ("If movies are media for the communication of ideas, so too are massively multiplayer
games.").
91. See JON FESTINGER, VIDEO GAME LAW 149–50 (Sunny Handa ed., LexisNexis 2005).
92. See Better Together, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2007, at 14.
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property in it are not developed for the avatars but for the real world users behind
the avatars. The imagery is created for and perceived by people in the real world,
just as fine art, television, and film are aimed at reaching the museum patron,
couch potato, and film buff. As one commentator notes, "[t]he virtual world is
not, therefore, simply the world of cyberspace: it is the potential actualisation of
this world into the real."93
For example, one real-world phenomenon springing forth from virtual worlds
is machinima. Machinima are short movies made by users of their virtual-world
experiences.94 “Creators use the 3D rendering capabilities of an existing game,
but use the game to stage a movie scene or video presentation, which they record
as it is played out. This recording is then distributed on the Internet as a
standalone short film.”95 People outside the virtual worlds have the opportunity to
view and enjoy these films.96 This phenomenon is just one example of virtual
world innovation reaching out and touching real world culture. Virtual property,
of course, facilitates this extension of innovation and creativity by enriching
experiences and making them more entertaining.
Still, one might wonder who would actually watch these films. In fact, there
are a large number of viewers,97 and a professional organization known as the
Academy of Machinima Arts and Science has been formed.98 But suppose that no
one ever viewed these machinima on the Internet.99 The cultural benefit in that
instance comes from the individual creators refining their skill and appreciation
of other creations. Professor Yochai Benkler explains:
[J]ust as learning how to read music and play an instrument can make one a
better-informed listener, so too a ubiquitous practice of making cultural artifacts
of all forms enables individuals in society to be better readers, listeners, and
viewers of professional produced culture, as well as contributors of our own
statements into this mix of collective culture.100

Therefore, culture is enhanced even when the machinima are not watched
because the users who create them can be better viewers of other machinima and
93. PRAMOD K. NAYAR, VIRTUAL WORLDS: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF
CYBERTECHNOLOGY 21 (Sage Publications 2004).
94. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 295 (Yale Univ. Press 2006); see also Ondrejka, supra note 56, at 161
(defining machinima as “the creation of movies within synthetic realities”).
95. BENKLER, supra note 94, at 295.
96. See, e.g., YouTube, leroy jenkins (Aug. 6, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=LkCNJRfSZBU.
97. As of December 3, 2008, the “leroy jenkins” video had been viewed over 8.6 million
times. See YouTube, supra note 96.
98. Ondrejka, supra note 56, at 161.
99. This factual situation is not all that different from the patent system. Overwhelming
evidence shows that most patents are worthless to society. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at
45 (citation omitted).
100. BENKLER, supra note 94, at 295.
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motion pictures and can add their own take on cultural developments happening
around them.
Like machinima, virtual property also has positive real-world cultural
implications even though it may seemingly only serve as a prop or landmark in
the machinima. Items created in virtual worlds might not be technologically
feasible in the real world at the present time, but innovation in virtual worlds may
provide a basis for helping real-world inventors or artists design around the
technological limitations they currently face. Moreover, innovation and creativity
in virtual worlds will afford users a new perspective that can be applied to the
real world. For example, the Serious Games Institute at Coventry University in
the United Kingdom is using virtual worlds as a tool for people to learn to work
together to solve real-world business problems.101 Increased innovation and
creativity within this context may aid in the development of solutions to existing
business problems. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, virtual property helps
tell users’ stories, promoting an exchange of ideas between real-world users
behind the avatars and enriching real-world culture.
B. Maximizing Innovation Via the Allocation of Virtual Property Rights?
Having established that innovation and creativity play vital roles in our
culture and that the development of virtual property contributes to that culture,
the question now becomes how rights in virtual property should be allocated to
maximize innovation and creativity. This question has not yet been answered.
Although I do not propose a definitive answer, this Section will explore the
arguments, counterarguments, and alternatives to allocating virtual property
rights to users.
Some commentators have argued that granting property rights to users is
innovation-maximizing.102 They argue that “[b]y safeguarding players’
intellectual property rights and giving them the right to make money from their
creations, [developers] foster genuine creativity and the production of new objects
and institutions, rather than mere crafting or tinkering.”103 This principle is, of
course, enshrined in our Constitution, which grants Congress the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”104
The principle is embodied by the virtual world Second Life, which grants its
users rights in the virtual property they create.105 When Second Life first launched

101. Getting Serious, supra note 63, at 1.
102. See generally Ondrejka, supra note 37 (asserting that granting property rights to users of
virtual worlds such as Second Life stimulates innovation in technology and commerce).
103. THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 9 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth
Simone Noveck eds., New York Univ. Press 2006).
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
105. See supra Part II.C.2.
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in June of 2003,106 it gave users the ability to create virtual property, but it
claimed ownership of that property.107 At its inception, Second Life saw only
modest growth.108 A team of experts assembled to investigate the problem
concluded that allowing users to own the property they created might attract new
participants.109 The developer changed its EULA to reflect this new model of user
ownership, and as a result, participation exploded.110 Not only did Second Life
attract more users, but the number of users creating virtual property also
increased.111
An alternate theory of innovation rejects the idea of user ownership. The
premise is that restricting property ownership to the developer alone actually
better promotes innovation because individual users are prevented from using
intellectual property law as a means to obstruct development.112 In this way,
granting ownership rights to developers creates a collaborative state where
designers are free to take a copy of what exists in the virtual world and build
upon one another’s work without barriers to innovation.113
A counterargument to the notion that innovation is maximized by providing
an economic incentive is that users create and innovate regardless of an economic
incentive.114 Professor Benkler questions,
Do users pay $x per month in the expectation that they will create something
that they can later license to others for a fee, or do they pay that sum in order to
get access to a platform of creative tools and connections with creative others,
so that they can collaborate on cocreating story lines and pretty pictures of their
own?115

It is true that some users would create regardless of their ability to sell their
creations.116 This sort of activity happens every day when users create virtual
property in virtual worlds that restrict virtual property rights to the developer117

106. Ondrejka, supra note 37, at 30.
107. Id. at 31.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Balkin, supra note 24, at 2065.
113. Id.
114. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 104-05 (Prometheus Books 2001); Benkler,
supra note 4, at 184; Laura G. Lape, A Balancing Act: Copyright in the Electronic Network
Environment, in SAFEGUARDING ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 37 (Jana Varlejs ed., Rutgers 1996).
115. Benkler, supra note 4, at 184.
116. See Lape, supra note 114, at 37 (citing Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:
A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281,
299–300 (1970); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29,
46–48 (1994)).
117. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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or forbid commercialization of virtual property.118 However, as Professor Benkler
also points out, different users are motivated by different incentives and some
users may have mixed motivations.119
Without empirical research on this topic, it is impossible to say definitively
that innovation and creativity are maximized if users own the virtual property
they create. But the possibility exists.120 Therefore, the task becomes identifying
the barriers that interfere with exploring this possibility and attempting to remove
them.
IV. PROBLEMS FACING VIRTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS
Because there exists at least the possibility that innovation and creativity are
maximized by granting users virtual property rights, it is useful to explore why
developers are reluctant to break away from the traditional model. Developers
assert three primary (and interrelated) arguments against adoption of the new
model of user ownership: (1) they wish to limit their liability; (2) they fear losing
control over the stylistic and administrative elements of the virtual world; and (3)
they are wary of being forced to create new features in their worlds in order to
maintain interest and subscribers.
A. Liability
One reason developers require users to assign their virtual property rights is
the fear of liability for losses of virtual property.121 Losses may result from poorly
118. See, e.g., EverQuest User Agreement and Software License ¶ 8 (Aug. 21, 2006),
http://help.station.sony.com/cgi-bin/soe.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=16210 (reserving all
rights in virtual property to the developer and emphasizing that the user “will not acquire or obtain
any intellectual property or other rights, including any right of exploitation” (emphasis added));
There.com Terms of Service: Member Agreement, http://webapps.prod.there.com/help/
74.xml (last visited Dec. 3, 2008) (“It is against There policy for members to sell member accounts
to another member for purposes of making a profit . . . . There Inc. can and will take action (which
may include suspension or termination) on any accounts found to be violating this policy.”).
119. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369, 426–27 (2002).
120. Users who have been granted ownership rights but have no desire to utilize them have
the option to disclaim them. This possibility is the case in Second Life. Once users create an object,
permissions can be set that allow other users to engage in certain activities such as modifying and
copying. See Marcus, supra note 59, at 74. Thus, a user who creates a virtual airplane is free to
donate it to the public domain for all other users to copy or modify freely. The user may also choose
to donate a subset of these rights – e.g., the right to copy the virtual property – and retain the
remaining rights and license them for a fee. If it is true that most users do not want to have an
exclusive ownership interest in their property and instead wish to donate it to the public domain,
then the EULA could offer a general license to everyone as a default, but also provide that users
have the option to retain specific rights as they opt in.
121. See Kayser, supra note 69, at 80–81 (“In an attempt to avoid liability for harm to players’
virtual property, Sony strictly disclaims any right of a player to establish a virtual property interest . .
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designed software, hardware failures, hackers stealing virtual property,122 or
viruses infiltrating the virtual-world system. For example, when developers create
and administer the virtual worlds, they may use “inadequate or outdated”
technologies that inadvertently erase data.123 Alternatively, human error could
erase or otherwise misplace virtual property data despite properly functioning
software.124 Theft of virtual property is another concern.125 As noted by one
commentator, “incidents of theft or destruction of virtual property are being
increasingly reported to police.”126 A judge in South Korea estimates that sixty
cases have been heard in Korean courts relating to hacking in virtual worlds.127
If users were not forced to assign their rights in virtual property, developers
might be exposed to liability for negligent design,128 strict liability for defective
design,129 or breach of express or implied warranties.130 This concern about
liability is certainly understandable. But if developers are assigned all rights in
user-created virtual property, then any losses are incurred by them, not the users
who created the property.131 Because users have no rights in the virtual property,
they have no cause of action against the developer.
. .”); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 787.
122. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1081 (2005).
123. YOCHAI BENKLER, RULES OF THE ROAD FOR THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY:
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW 307 (West 1996) (discussing communications
systems).
124. Id.
125. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 293,
304–05 (2004). It should be noted that the theft being addressed here is unauthorized theft. In some
virtual worlds, theft is part of the game, and users expect their virtual property to be stolen and
expect to be able to steal property from other users. Id. In such virtual worlds, developers ought not
have fear of liability.
126. Fairfield, supra note 122, at 1081.
127. Getting Serious, supra note 63, at 2.
128. Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57
S.C. L. REV. 255, 275–76 (2005) (suggesting the imposition of a common-law duty to guard
against database intruders).
129. See generally Frances E. Zollers, et al., No More Soft Landings For Software: Liability
for Defects in an Industry that Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
745, 758–64 (2005) (discussing the precursor cases leading up to the inevitable imposition of
negligence and strict liability to software developers). But see Antel Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v.
Sirus Leasing Co., 475 N.Y.S.2d 944, 945 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (rejecting negligence and strict
liability claims against manufacturer of computer system for lost data because of the “economic
damages” doctrine). An argument could be made that a bailment is created by users maintaining
their virtual property on the developers’ hardware and that developers could be liable for violation of
the duty of care that the bailment creates. “The bailment concept, however, is limited to tangible
personal property and generally goes not extend to either real or intangible property.” A. Darby
Dickerson, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liability in Commercial Bailments, 41
VAND. L. REV. 129, 131 (1988) (citation omitted).
130. See Zollers et al., supra note 129, at 764.
131. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 787 (discussing developers’ use of EULAs to shield
themselves from liability).
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If users ought to maintain property rights, but developers fear liability for
losses to the property, one solution would be for developers to allow users to
retain their rights, but include an exculpatory clause in the EULA. This solution,
however, may not provide developers with enough certainty or protection for
three reasons.
First, there is a lack of consistency across states regarding the enforceability
of exculpatory clauses.132 Some states uphold these clauses,133 while others strike
them down as violative of public policy.134 For example, a California statute135
has been used to strike down an exculpatory clause attempting to protect a harbor
owner from liability to a yacht owner when the harbor failed to provide adequate
security, which resulted in the plaintiff’s yacht being vandalized.136 Similarly, the
Connecticut Supreme Court found an exculpatory clause purporting to hold skiresort operators harmless for their own future negligence unenforceable.137 The
Connecticut Supreme Court’s rejection of the exculpatory clause on public policy
grounds was based on the fact that the injury was personal rather than
economic.138 Given the national and international nature of online gaming, it
would be difficult for developers to have any confidence that their liability would
be limited in the face of these inconsistencies.139
Second, even in jurisdictions that enforce exculpatory clauses, these clauses
are not favored and are strictly construed.140 In enforcing these clauses, courts
have emphasized that the language used must be unmistakable, unambiguous,
and understandable.141 For example, in Audley v. Melton, a model who was bitten
132. See Dickerson, supra note 129, at 132–34 n.22 (outlining which states have enforced
these clauses and which have held them invalid or strongly disfavored).
133. See, e.g., Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2005) (“An
exculpatory clause is unenforceable if it is ambiguous in scope, purports to release the benefited
party from liability for intentional, willful or wanton acts; or contravenes public policy.”).
134. See Dickerson, supra note 129, at 133–34 n.22 (listing the states that disfavor
exculpatory clauses).
135. The California statute provides that “[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directlyor
indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the
law.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985). However, much confusion exists over which types of
exculpatory clauses the statute prohibits. See Health Net of Cal., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 6
Cal. Rptr. 3d 235, 242–49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
136. Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor, 230 Cal. Rptr. 253, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
137. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 747 (Conn. 2005).
138. Id. at 741. The court noted that “[t]he ultimate determination of what constitutes the
public interest must be made considering the totality of the circumstances of any given case against
the backdrop of current societal expectations.” Id. at 744 (quoting Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 527
(Md. 1994)).
139. To mitigate this problem, the EULA could have a choice of law clause which selects a
state that enforces exculpatory clauses.
140. See, e.g., Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d
644, 649 (Ky. 2007); Alack v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Missouri, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. 1996).
141. Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 334-35 (citing Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979)).

52

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:33

in the head by a lion during a photo shoot sued the owner of the photography
studio alleging negligence for failing to take precautionary measures to protect
her from the lion.142 The defendant submitted two exculpatory clauses signed by
the model stating that she agreed to release the defendant from any and all
liability.143 The New Hampshire Supreme Court invalidated the exculpatory
clauses not on public policy grounds, but because it only referred to liability
generally and not specifically to the defendant’s own negligence.144 Although
developers might be able to draft unmistakable and unambiguous exculpatory
clauses that are applicable even when strictly construed against them, these forces
do little to ease developers’ concerns about avoiding liability.
Third, and probably most problematic for developers, is that a EULA
containing an exculpatory clause may be held unconscionable. Generally, clickthrough or shrink-wrap agreements are enforceable unless they are
unconscionable,145 but the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes that “a
party’s attempt to exempt himself from liability for negligent conduct may fail as
unconscionable.”146 It is not surprising then, that despite (or perhaps because of)
their sweeping scope, traditional-model EULAs have been scrutinized by
commentators who are concerned with unconscionability.147 Professor Lederman
warns:
[W]here a single party with more information drafts an agreement and presents
it to numerous parties, each with much less at stake, and in circumstances in
which bargaining over the terms is not a realistic option, courts may be inclined
to protect the group with less at stake. In particular, courts maydeem provisions
in these types of agreements to be unenforceable if they overly favor the
drafter.148

In fact, developers are “usually multinational corporations such as Microsoft,
Sony, and Electronic Arts.”149 In contrast, users are typically individuals
(sometimes teenagers) who often fail to read the EULA before clicking on it.150
In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the New York Appellate Division held an
arbitration clause between a consumer and a software/hardware merchant to be

142. Audley v. Melton, 640 A.2d 777, 778 (N.H. 1994).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 779. The general language in the exculpatory clause “did not put the plaintiff on
clear notice of such intent [to release the defendant from liability for his own negligence].” Id.
145. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448–49 (7th Cir. 1996).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. b (1981).
147. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 50–51; Leandra Lederman, “Stranger Than
Fiction”: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1620, 1635–36 (2007); Meehan, supra note
19, at 14 (“Whether the EULAs in online games, such as MindArk’s EULA for Project Entropia,
are unconscionable is debatable.” (footnote omitted)).
148. Lederman, supra note 147, at 1639 (footnotes omitted).
149. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 2, at 54.
150. Lederman, supra note 147, at 1635–36.
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unconscionable.151 The arbitration clause mandated arbitration by International
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) rules, which were difficult to obtain because the
ICC was located in France and had few contacts with the United States.152
Moreover, the ICC rules required the complaining party to advance fees of
$4,000 ($2,000 of which was nonrefundable), which generally exceeded the cost
of the computer systems in dispute.153 The court found these terms “egregiously
oppressive” and rendered the arbitration clause unconscionable and
unenforceable.154
A court could likewise find an exculpatory clause in a EULA to be
unconscionable. In Brower, although the arbitration clause required excessive
fees and forced the parties to take burdensome actions before pursuing their
claims, the plaintiffs were not wholly deprived of a forum.155 In the virtual world
context, an exculpatory clause would render users’ claims against developers
invalid. In essence, users would be left with a forum, but without claims. Because
no court has yet addressed the enforceability of exculpatory clauses in EULAs in
the virtual-world context, 156 developers cannot be assured that such provisions
will protect them from liability.
For these three reasons, exculpatory clauses are an insufficient solution to
resolve the conflict between allowing users to retain their rights in virtual
property and protecting developers from liability for harm to users’ virtual
property.
B. Loss of Control
Another reason developers require users to assign their virtual property rights
is the developers’ fear of losing control over their worlds.157 Developers fear not
being able to change the worlds and their property characteristics, kick out users
who do not follow rules, and otherwise modify the world to keep users interested.
In essence, they “argue that their need to develop and expand the virtual
environment necessitates locking out private property interests.”158 This argument
is commonly expressed in a speculative form:159 “What happens if the actions of
151. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
152. Id. at 571.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 574–75.
155. Id. at 571.
156. The closest a court has come to discussing EULAs in the virtual-world context is
Davidson & Assoc., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004). In
Davidson, the court held that the EULA was not unconscionable under California law because the
defendants, sophisticated computer programmers, were not “unwitting members of the general
public” and had the option to disagree to the terms and return the software. Id. at 1179–80.
However, the court did not address exculpatory clauses or assignment-of-rights provisions as they
were not issues in the case.
157. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 788–89.
158. Fairfield, supra note 122, at 1097.
159. Id.
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the [developer] in some way damage or devalue the virtual object in which a user
holds a property interest?”160 If the developer wanted to exit the market and shut
down the virtual world, would it “be somehow required to maintain that virtual
world in perpetuity because of still-existing property on its servers?”161
But as Professor Fairfield points out, these questions are not new and the
answers do not necessarily lead to liability or loss of control for developers.162 In
fact, threats to users’ property interests in the virtual world are no different from
those faced in the real world. For example, speculation in land is risky since “new
developments can always devalue prior investments.”163 Similarly, manufacturers
modify the supply of goods “knowing that the resulting changes in value due to
scarcity will affect prior purchasers.”164 These threats to property interests do not
justify a refusal to grant rights in the first place.165 These are simply risks
associated with property ownership in general. With respect to developers
wanting to shut down the virtual world, it is true that doing so “certainly deprives
the [users] of the value of their [property], but in no greater fashion than
bankruptcy deprives equity holders of the value of their stock.”166 I would not
advocate the elimination of private-stock ownership because of the possibility of
bankruptcy,167 and neither do I argue that we should eliminate user-owned virtual
property because of the possibility of the virtual world disappearing. Thus,
although ownership of virtual property by users might conceivably limit
developers’ control over the worlds they create, it is not nearly the parade of
horribles that developers anticipate. To maintain an adequate amount of control
over virtual worlds, developers can always specify limitations in EULAs on
users’ virtual property or the scope of the licenses the users must grant to
developers.
Finally, developers’ concerns about locking out users or terminating their
accounts may be alleviated if virtual worlds become interoperable. This term
refers to the movement currently underway to make property in one virtual world
compatible with the software in another virtual world.168 If interoperability is
achieved, then users would be able to take their virtual property in one world that
was shutting down or otherwise restricting their access and move it to another
virtual world. Interoperability would allow developers to maintain control over
160. Id. at 1097–98.
161. Id. at 1098.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See generally Daniel Terdiman, Tech Titans Seek Virtual-World Interoperability, CNET
News, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.news.com/Tech-titans-seek-virtual-world-interoperability/2100
1043_3-6213148.html (noting the status of converting virtual worlds to interoperatability); Virtual
World Interoperability, http://vwinterop.wikidot.com/start (last visited Dec. 3, 2008) (summarizing
the results of the 2007 Virtual Worlds Interoperability Community Summit).
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their worlds because users who did not like the new rules could take their
property elsewhere.
C. Forced to Create
The final reason for requiring users to assign their rights in virtual property
to developers is related to control. Developers claim that because user ownership
in virtual property would incentivize users to create and sell their own virtual
property, developers will be forced to innovate at a fast pace to keep users
interested.169 Developers fear that these more sophisticated users will become
bored with the virtual world and may turn their attention (and subscription fees)
elsewhere.170 To retain subscribers, developers worry that they will continually
have to make difficult, expensive, and time-consuming updates to the worlds.171
The developers’ perspective is backwards. Instead, developers should invite
increased user innovation and creativity, which may actually make their jobs
easier. For example, in Second Life, users retain their rights in virtual property
and a large number of them participate in the creative process.172 Not only do
users individually create virtual property, but they also teach other users how to
create by running classes online.173 Of course, users benefit from user-created
virtual property because the virtual world is enhanced, making it more enjoyable
and challenging. But user contributions also benefit developers, who do not have
to invest their own resources creating what others have done for them.174 Users, in
essence, become subdesigners.175 Moreover, permitting or encouraging users to
develop their own creative skills increases the possibility that they may eventually
cross over to become developers themselves.176 Such a transformation may lead
to improvements in the development of virtual worlds generally.
In the end, developers’ concerns that promoting user innovation would force
them to create at a faster pace than they would otherwise create is not much of a
concern at all. By allowing users to retain rights in the virtual property they
create, more innovation and creativity may take place, permitting developers to sit
back and let users create for them. But even if it were true that developers would
be forced to be more creative under a user-ownership model, would that be so
bad? Keeping an eye towards the goal of maximizing innovation and creativity
suggests that such a result would be preferred.
169. See Lederman, supra note 147, at 1637.
170. See id. at 1637–38.
171. See id. at 1637.
172. As of 2006, “[s]ixty-six percent of Second Life users . . . created objects from scratch
using the built-in modeling system . . . and more than 15 percent have even written script code from
scratch.” Ondrejka, supra note 56, at 163.
173. Id.
174. See Saunders, supra note 47, at 232 (noting that user created content attracts more
players).
175. Balkin, supra note 24, at 2049.
176. See Ondrejka, supra note 56, at 161.
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D. Developers’ Rational Choice and Market Failures
Because loss of control and being forced to create are not necessarily valid
justifications for developers requiring users to assign their rights in the virtual
property they create, the only legitimate justification is the fear of liability for lost
or stolen data composing the virtual property. As discussed, exculpatory clauses
do not sufficiently remedy this concern.177 As a result, the only way to explore
whether user ownership best maximizes innovation and creativity is to expose
developers to liability in the event that users’ virtual property is compromised.
This conclusion, of course, is not enticing to developers. Thus, there remains a
need to remove the barriers that inhibit choosing a system that can maximize
innovation and creativity.
One potential solution is a legislatively created safe harbor. However, it is
first necessary to understand why we should not merely let the market control the
issue. In other words, if ownership is important to users, will they not eventually
choose to participate only in virtual worlds that permit user ownership?178 Second
Life made this move in 2003 without the help of a safe harbor;179 why should
other developers be provided an extra incentive for doing so? Won’t new virtual
worlds entering the market seize upon this opportunity and allow users to retain
their rights?180
While allowing the market to take care of the issue sounds nice in theory, it
has failed in practice. Since Second Life changed its EULA in 2003 to allow
users to retain rights in their virtual creations,181 there has not been a shift by
other developers to follow suit.182 Several possible reasons explain why the
market has not dictated a change in EULA terms. Perhaps the market is simply
slow to respond. Maybe users are not leaving their virtual world of choice to go to
Second Life where they can enjoy the fruits of virtual property ownership.183
Perhaps users are splitting their time between virtual worlds; there is no
requirement that users can only participate in one virtual world at a time. Or
maybe users are, in fact, leaving to go to Second Life, but developers’ fears of
liability are so strong that they refuse to change their EULAs to compete with
Second Life. The reason why the market has failed to make these changes is not
important. The real question is whether we should sacrifice potential innovation
and creativity while we wait to see if the market can adjust. Rather than

177. See supra notes 132–156 and accompanying text.
178. Marcus, supra note 59, at 86.
179. See supra notes 106–111 and accompanying text.
180. Marcus, supra note 59, at 86 (“Creating a new virtual platform that allows users to retain
copyrights for their creations becomes a safer investment for those seeking new avenues of financial
opportunity.”).
181. See supra notes 106–111 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
183. This lack of movement could be a result of lock-in effects, where users become so
invested in their characters and social interactions in other worlds that it is difficult to leave.
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speculating and waiting for a change that may not occur, we have the opportunity
to solve the problem now with the creation of a legislative safe harbor.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH—REMOVING BARRIERS
THROUGH A SAFE HARBOR
This Article does not set forth the text for a proposed legislative safe harbor.
That drafting is a task for Congress, which should finalize the details of the
legislation after conferring with the appropriate stakeholders—namely,
developers and users. Instead, this Section discusses general concerns that should
be considered when creating the safe harbor, the goal of which should be to
resolve the conflict that currently exists between limiting developers’ liability for
losses to users’ virtual property and granting users rights in the virtual property
they create to potentially maximize innovation and creativity.
Before delving into the proposed safe harbor, it may be helpful to examine
cursorily another recent legislative safe harbor as a baseline for comparative
purposes. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) provides a safe
harbor for online service providers to protect them from copyright infringement
claims provided certain conditions are met.184 In general, the DMCA safe harbor
prevents monetary damages rather than injunctive relief.185 The DMCA safe
harbor only applies to certain classes of service providers, including “conduit
providers such as telephone companies, those who store or cache content hosted
by another, those who host content posted by another, and search engines.”186 The
legislation requires service providers to designate an agent to receive notifications
of infringement claims187 and to adopt a policy that provides for the termination
of repeat infringers.188 Importantly, Congress stressed that the DMCA safe
harbor procedures were voluntary, but that any service provider “wishing to avail
itself of one of the safe harbors . . . is effectively required to cooperate, since
compliant notice from a copyright owner will be deemed legally sufficient to
establish that the [service provider] had actual or constructive knowledge that its
facilities were being used to infringe.”189
But what was the purpose of the DMCA safe harbor? Why did Congress
decide to act? Prior to enactment of the DMCA, cases were split over whether
service providers, such as bulletin board operators and internet service providers,
184. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000); Mark A. Lemley,
Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 103–04 (2007)
(noting that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 “creates immunity from monetary
liability for copyright infringing material” and is “subject to a number of requirements and
limitations”).
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (2000); Lemley, supra note 184, at 103–04.
186. Lemley, supra note 184, at 104 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d)).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)–(3).
188. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
189. Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 121 (2005) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 54 (1998)).
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could be liable for direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement.190
Although the view that service providers generally should not be held liable for
user-posted infringing content was largely embraced by a majority of courts,191
other groups thought differently.192 One such group was the Information
Infrastructure Task Force Working Group, which recommended more rigid
treatment of service providers and wanted to impose the burden of preventing
copyright infringement on service providers rather than copyright owners.193 Of
course, service providers objected and lobbied Congress.194 To design an
approach to liability that would satisfy both service providers and copyright
owners, Congress pushed negotiations between these groups, which resulted in
the DMCA safe harbor provisions.195
One purpose of introducing a safe harbor into the realm of virtual worlds is
to limit the potential liability of developers so they will be willing to relinquish
control over virtual property created by their users. Thus, the first issue to
address is the scope of the limitation on developers’ liability. Should the
limitation of liability extend to all conduct and causes of action, or should it apply
only to specific causes of action? Should it permit liability but place a cap on the
amount of damages that can be recovered? If a cap on damages is appropriate, at
what amount should the cap be set?
At a minimum, the safe harbor should protect developers who negligently
design their systems or negligently act in a way that destroys virtual property.196
But should such a protection extend to gross negligence and recklessness?197 On
190. See generally Scott, supra note 189, at 110–113 (discussing different approaches to
liability of service providers illustrated by two federal court decisions) (citing Playboy Enter., Inc. v.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
191. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 184, at 101 n.2 (referencing federal and state court
decisions holding that service providers are not liable for a wide range of content posted or sent
through their system or another).
192. See generally Scott, supra note 189, at 113–15 (discussing opposition to service provider
safe harbor rules by a presidential task force).
193. Id.
194. See id. at 116 (quoting JESSICA LITMAN, supra note 114, at 122).
195. Scott, supra note 189, at 116.
196. This protection is an effective way to ensure that innovation and creativityare maximized
under the new model of user ownership. A primary reason developers cite for maintaining the
traditional model of ownership is fear of liability if virtual property is compromised. See discussion
supra Part IV.A.
197. The terms gross negligence and recklessness essentially have the same meaning. See,
e.g., Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 233 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n tort cases [recklessness]
sometimes denotes little more than gross negligence.”); St. Onge v. Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co.,
321 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). Recklessness and gross negligence have been
described as “the want of even slight care and diligence.” Lenard v. Dilley, 805 So.2d 175, 180 (La.
2002) (quoting State v. Vinzant, 7 So.2d 917, 922 (La. 1942)). Ordinary negligence, on the other
hand, “consists of mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or failure to take precautions.”
Ickes v. Tille, 674 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d
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the one hand, developers must have enough incentive to allow users to retain their
property rights. Otherwise, the status quo will persist, and creativity will not be
maximized. On the other hand, we do not want to encourage poorly designed
software, especially considering the number of users and amount of money
invested in the software.
Although this issue should be examined in more depth before creation of the
safe harbor, it seems that market forces may help answer the question. In fact,
consider the competitive effects of the market as it currently operates. The
companies that run virtual worlds are generally large multinational companies
with many shareholders. They compete with one another for subscribers and have
their reputations at stake. It is unlikely that a developer would risk losing its
subscribers to competitors and subjecting itself to bad press for engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless behavior. For example, imagine a developer that
recklessly designed a virtual world that erased or otherwise compromised its
users’ virtual property. It would not take long for users to flock to a competing
virtual world where their property would be protected. Because virtual worlds
serve substantially social functions,198 the network effects would be huge. Once
the negatively affected users left the reckless virtual world, unaffected users
would also leave to interact with their peers. This scenario would instantaneously
ruin a reckless developer. In this way, whether reckless or grossly negligent
conduct is protected by the safe harbor is probably not important; it seems
unlikely that such conduct will take place, and if it does, the developer will be put
out of business by the market. But because the distinction between negligence on
the one hand and recklessness or gross negligence on the other may be difficult to
determine, it is administratively easier to protect all developer conduct. In
addition, the threat of potential litigation or nuisance suits would be reduced
because of the establishment of a clear limitation on liability.
Probably more important is the need to protect developers from liability for
their intentional conduct in maintaining or developing virtual worlds in ways that
adversely affect users’ virtual property. For example, a developer might decide to
limit the speed at which virtual cars can be driven because higher speeds use too
much of the system’s computational resources. This change to user-developed
virtual cars would arguably harm the value of the users’ property (assuming users
prefer the ability to drive faster cars). The developer’s choice to make this
modification was clearly intentional and would negatively impact some users, but
the modification was necessary for the good of the virtual world. Developers’
actions with respect to administering and changing the virtual world are almost
always intentional, but they should not be subject to liability each time they make
a change affecting users’ virtual property. If the safe harbor does not protect
against developers’ intentional acts, it would be too easy for users to plead
around the safe harbor by alleging intentional misconduct. And although
developers can specify some limitations on users’ virtual property in EULAs,
699, 703 n.3 (Ohio 1990)).
198. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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additional protection via a safe harbor strengthens this understanding on both
sides and ensures that developers have flexibility to conduct business without the
disruption of litigation. Not only would a safe harbor assuage developers’ fear of
liability, but it would also alleviate concerns about losing control of virtual
worlds.
Although intentional conduct covers rogue developers who maliciously delete
or otherwise harm users’ virtual property, this type of conduct should also be
protected by the safe harbor. Even though malicious harm to virtual property is
not the type of activity the law should encourage, this type of conduct is not a
major concern. The same market forces that restrain developers from reckless
conduct will also discourage intentional harms.
The safe harbor should further extend to breaches of implied warranty
claims. However, it should not protect developers from breaches of express
warranties. Once the safe harbor is created, developers may provide extra
protection to their users in the form of express warranties as a means of
competing with other developers. Developers that choose to extend these
additional protections and subject themselves to liability notwithstanding the safe
harbor should not be able to use the safe harbor as a tool to commit fraud on
users.
Finally, the safe harbor should also extend to circumstances where developers
wish to terminate the virtual world. This extension is analogous to bankruptcy in
the real world;199 users should be aware of the risk that their property interests
could become worthless. Because users should understand this risk going in, there
is no need to hold developers liable for losses to users’ virtual property. Also, as
previously discussed, there is a movement underway to make virtual property
interoperable.200 If this goal is achieved, developers should be required to give
notice to their users before terminating a virtual world so that the users can back
up their property and take it to another virtual world.
An alternative to limiting the type of conduct that is protected is to place a
cap on the amount of damages that can be recovered from a developer. If a cap is
used, a second issue becomes the amount at which to cap damages. However, a
cap on damages is not advisable. Because the value of virtual property is
relatively small for most objects, it would be unwise to open the floodgates for
several minor claims that are little more than nuisance suits. This scenario is
particularly true if the developer would be subject to liability for intentional
conduct. Unless the cap is a trivial amount, most destroyed virtual property will
not reach the capped amount. On the other hand, for virtual objects that have
significant real world value, such as the three virtual shopping malls for
$179,688 or the virtual space station worth nearly $100,000,201 a cap on damages
may be useful to protect developers. This protection for costlier property, of
course, would have to be balanced against the potential increases in litigation
costs associated with suits for less valuable virtual property. Because of these
199. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
201. See Irvine, supra note 64.
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unknown and likely unknowable facts, the safe harbor should focus on the
developers’ conduct rather than on the amount of damages recoverable.
It is important to note that the safe harbor should be voluntary. Developers
should have the choice whether to permit users to retain rights in their virtual
property or instead to adhere to the traditional model of developer ownership.
Why make the safe harbor optional? Why not require developers to change their
EULAs so that users retain rights in their virtual property or state that,
notwithstanding EULAs to the contrary, rights in virtual property belong to
users? An optional safe harbor is preferable because of the differences in each
virtual world. For some developers, complete control and property ownership
might be so important that they are not able to achieve their purpose in creating
the virtual world without it. An optional safe harbor recognizes that maximizing
innovation and creativity is not the primary goal for all developers. There are
competing interests at stake, and it may be harmful to developers to ignore them.
In fact, it is not clear that user ownership of virtual property rights will
necessarily maximize innovation.202 If the safe harbor were mandatory and users
owned rights in their virtual property, developers with no interest in marketing
user-created virtual property would be unaffected because they would be shielded
from liability and would have the power to regulate the virtual world as they saw
fit. However, users wanting to improve or modify existing property may be
restrained in that pursuit if the property owner refuses to license the copyright in
the virtual property. This result may not maximize innovation, however, and
developers committed to that goal may be interested in freely licensing virtual
property to anyone willing to innovate. Again, the question of which regime best
maximizes innovation is debatable, but a voluntary approach allows a level of
flexibility for developers to structure the operation of their virtual worlds and
plan for unforeseen events.
This voluntary approach is similar to the approach taken by Congress in the
DMCA safe harbor.203 Presumably, Congress could have required service
providers to comply with the notice and takedown provisions but instead chose to
avoid meddling too much with the operation of the service providers’ businesses.
The DMCA approach also incentivizes service providers to act in ways that
minimize copyright-infringement occurrences.204 Similarly, a virtual-world safe
harbor would incentivize developers to permit users to maintain control over their
virtual creations, which may have the effect of increasing innovation and
creativity.
Why would a developer choose to use an optional safe harbor rather than
keep the assignment provisions of the EULA? The answer is certainty. There is
some concern that assignment and exculpatory provisions in traditional EULAs

202. See supra Part III.B.
203. See Scott, supra note 189, at 121 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 54 (1998)).
204. Sven Eric Skillrud, An Umbrella or a Canopy?: Why the 17 U.S.C. Section 512(a) Safe
Harbor Should Be Read Broadly, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 91, 96 (2005) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998)).
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may be unconscionable.205 Also, the courts have not been uniform in the debate
on the enforceability of clickwrap and shrinkwrap agreements.206 Most cases
dealing with the unconscionability of assignment provisions in contracts arise in
the employment context. Regarding copyrights, the issue arises under the “works
made for hire” doctrine, which is set forth in the Copyright Act.207 Under this
provision, “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment”208 is initially owned by the employer.209 Regarding patents, “[i]t is
well settled that an agreement on the part of an inventor to assign inventions
developed while in the employ of another is not inequitable, or
unconscionable.”210
Nonetheless, there may be reason to treat assignment provisions in virtualworld EULAs differently and find them unconscionable. In the employment
context, the employee/innovator is compensated to create, so it makes sense to
uphold the validity of assignment provisions and apply the works made for hire
doctrine. There is an exchange of salary,211 lump sum payments, or royalties212 for
creative efforts. But the virtual world is different; in this context, the
user/innovator pays the developer a subscription fee for the ability to create, not
the other way around.213 Upholding the assignment provision in the EULA would
not involve the same type of exchange as in the employment context. An
analogous scenario in the employment context would consist of an
employee/innovator paying the employer for the ability to work on projects, and
once complete, the intellectual property would belong to the employer. In the
virtual world context, courts might be more willing to find such an assignment
provision unconscionable.

205. See supra Part IV.A. See also Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F.
Supp. 2d 1101, 1106 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“Whether contracts such as [the plaintiff’s] EULAare valid
is a much-disputed question.”).
206. See generally Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of "Clickwrap" or
"Shrinkwrap" Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions,
106 A.L.R.5TH 309 (2003) (highlighting cases in which clickwrap and shrinkwrap licenses have
been upheld and struck down).
207. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and,
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all
of the rights comprised in the copyright.”).
208. Id. § 101.
209. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
210. Patent & Licensing Corp. v. Olsen, 188 F.2d 522, 525 (2nd Cir. 1951).
211. See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 641-42 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that a regular salary paid to an artistic
director to make dances weighed in favor of finding an employment relationship and applying the
work made for hire doctrine).
212. See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
a work-for-hire relationship despite the payment of mere royalties).
213. See supra note 51 (describing subscription fees for various virtual worlds).
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This uncertainty about unconscionability serves as a bargaining chip for both
developers and users and makes a safe harbor resolution possible. Developers
would rather eliminate fears of liability upfront and allow users to retain their
rights than risk lawsuits arguing the unconscionability of EULAs. If users
successfully challenge EULAs on unconscionability grounds, developers will be
stuck without property rights and will have little power to protect themselves
from liability. On the other hand, if users are unsuccessful in their
unconscionability challenges, developers will have little need for a safe harbor,
and users would again be left without rights in their virtual property. As
illustrated, this situation may not be innovation-maximizing. For these reasons, if
a safe harbor is to be created, it should be done quickly while uncertainty still
exists. Uncertainty also existed in the DMCA context and was the impetus for a
safe harbor.214 Although courts favored not holding service providers liable for
copyright infringement for user-posted content, there was no consensus.215 The
Information Infrastructure Task Force Working Group’s recommendation cast
doubt on that certainty and paved the way for the DMCA safe harbor, which
benefited stakeholders on both sides of the issue.216
Of course, the DMCA safe harbor is not completely analogous to the virtualworld safe harbor. In the virtual-world context, the possibility of governance by
private contract law is available. In the service-provider setting, private contract
law was not an option because copyright owners were not contracting with
service providers. But even the options available to users and developers under
contract law are imperfect; exculpatory217 and assignment clauses218 are
vulnerable. Moreover, parties in virtual worlds are not really fighting over the
same rights. Although it may appear that both developers and users want virtual
property rights, users want virtual property rights, and developers want to avoid
responsibility for this property. A safe harbor can resolve this conflict and
remove barriers that unnecessarily deter developers, users, and the market from
agreeing on a scheme that best allows creativity and innovation to flourish.
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the relatively new and exciting development of virtual worlds
that is upon us, the creative developments occurring each day within the worlds,
and the new sources of entertainment and cultural growth available from them,
we should seize the opportunity to maximize this creativity and innovation.
Virtual property does not only enhance virtual worlds; it adds to the cultural
development of the real world as well.219
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Unfortunately, developers’ fears of liability, loss of control, and being forced
to create at an increased rate are preventing us from exploring systems that
maximize creativity and innovation.220 Traditional-model EULAs attempt to ease
developers’ fears by requiring users to assign all of their rights in their virtual
property to developers,221 but this plan may inhibit user innovation.222 However,
aside from the fear of liability for losses to users’ virtual property, these fears are
either overstated or illegitimate.223 The fear of liability is a valid concern, and
unless a change is made to the status quo, there is no indication that we will be
able to take full advantage of the creativity and innovation waiting in the wings.
To help resolve this tension, a legislatively created safe harbor should be
passed to limit developers’ liability for conduct that destroys or otherwise harms
users’ virtual property.224 Drafting such a safe harbor would require input from
the stakeholders, namely the developers and users, but it generally should protect
against claims for negligence, gross negligence or recklessness, intentional
conduct, and breach of implied warranties.225
Although the idea of congressional intervention into the realm of virtual
property largely used in video games may seem like a strange proposal, it must be
remembered that although virtual worlds began as video games, their use has
already expanded beyond this context and into other areas such as medicine,
military, and athletics.226 It would be a shame to stifle innovation in these
industries and others because virtual worlds had their genesis in the gaming
industry.
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